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Workplace Justice in the United
States: An Introduction
Where there is no rule of law but only the command of persons,
where secrecy and arbitrariness reign, where one never knows
when or why the axe will fall, there justice weeps. (Wolterstorff
2001)
Human dignity at the workplace requires just treatment by those
holding authority. At the crux of this matter is protection from arbitrary
action—action that is based upon personality rather than merit, and is
not predictable on any reasoned basis. When a human being is treated
merely as a means to an end or a thing to be employed by others, rather
than as a person deserving justice, justice does indeed weep. This is
especially true where a person’s job is at stake. In our society, an indi-
vidual’s job is not only a source of economic goods, but also an impor-
tant part of how we define ourselves—and others define us—and our
role in society. Where workers can be terminated from their employ-
ment for any reason, or none at all, arbitrariness reigns. Yet, this is
historically the basic principle of the law of employment termination
in the United States.
The situation is quite different in Western Europe and nearly all
other countries. In these countries, there exists a general principle of
law that dictates that workers cannot be terminated without cause. This
principle is enforced either in labor courts, other specialized courts, or
in the general court system.
The American rule of employment-at-will—that a person can be
fired at any time for any, or no, reason—has deep roots in the nation’s
jurisprudence. It was announced in a legal treatise in 1877, and is
known as ‘‘Wood’s rule,’’ named for the author of the treatise, Horace
Gay Wood. He stated, ‘‘With us [in America, unlike in England] the
rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie at
will’’ (Willborn, Schwab, and Burton 1993, p. 15). It has remained the
general rule ever since. Its practical result is that, absent a statute or
contract to the contrary, workers have no right to insist upon a just
cause for their termination.
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If employment were simply an economic transaction where a com-
modity called labor is bought and sold, we would need not concern
ourselves about justice. The conventional wisdom in economics takes
just such a view of employment. From this perspective, employment-
at-will simply reflects the reality of a market. However, it is reasonably
clear that, although there are aspects of employment that are congenial
to an economic view, the full reality of employment is much more than
that. As David Ewing, a former editor of Harvard Business Review,
has said: ‘‘A company is a kind of society, its management a type of
government, and managements that manage justly, as employees see
justness, gain potent advantages over managements that do not’’
(Ewing 1989, p. 3). For a society to be managed justly, the substantive
rules of workplace behavior must be just, and there must be mecha-
nisms in place that deliver procedural ‘‘due process’’ (Ewing 1989).
Corporations are social organizations arranged in a hierarchy in
which those at the top exercise authority over those at the bottom.
This inevitably means that control must be exerted over those who are
employed by others. In such circumstances, both human nature and
differing interests between the employed and the employer give rise to
a situation in which an abuse of power is not only possible, but highly
likely (Wheeler 1997). In the workplace, there are order-givers and
order-takers, and a common instrument of control by order-givers is
the threat of a termination of the relationship. Ultimately, employees
who do not behave as they are ordered will be separated from the
organization—fired.
Fortunately, since the days when Wood’s employment-at-will prin-
ciple was adopted by American courts in the late nineteenth century,
there has been considerable erosion of it. In fact, management attor-
neys have recently claimed that it is gone entirely, but the reality of the
matter is a bit more complicated than that. What has occurred over a
period of about 90 years is the construction of a patchwork of limita-
tions on employment-at-will. This has been aptly described as the grad-
ual slicing away of an entire pie of rights that at one time wholly
belonged to employers, until the remainder is only a remnant of what
once was (Bennett-Alexander and Hartman 2001). Yet, in truth, the
employer’s portion is still quite substantial. Arguably, it has grown
significantly by virtue of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions that will
be discussed later in this book.
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THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
WORKPLACE JUSTICE
The road to the present system of workplace justice in the United
States has been long and convoluted. Perhaps the clearest starting point
is the enactment of the Clayton Act, effective in 1914. Hailed as ‘‘la-
bor’s Magna Carta’’ at the time, it declared that ‘‘the labor of a human
being is not a commodity or article of commerce.’’ Although the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation kept the Clayton Act from being a boon
to labor, at least the principle was recorded as a part of American labor
policy.
With the Great Depression and New Deal came the Wagner Act in
1935, which protected workers from termination based on their union
activity. Legislation adopted in the 1960s prohibited termination on the
basis of race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or age (Title VII,
Civil Rights Act of 1964; Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967). The Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970 prohibited
employers from terminating employees for seeking remedies for safety
and health hazards. Based on this legislation, employees are protected
against discrimination on the basis of union activity, race, color, na-
tional origin, sex, age, and their actions to ensure a safe workplace.
In the 1980s, state courts began creating exceptions to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Terminations that violated public policy, im-
plied-in-fact contracts (often based on employee handbooks or
company rules), and implied-in-law contractual obligations of good
faith and fair dealing were held to give rise to legal claims on the part
of employees. The manner of a termination, if abusive, could make the
employer liable for damages.
The 1980s and early 1990s brought a spate of employment legisla-
tion. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 prohibited em-
ployers from discriminating against legal aliens; the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 limited the use of lie detectors in
firing workers; and the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act of 1988 (WARN Act) required employers to give 60 days’ advance
notice of a plant closing or mass layoff.
One of the more significant changes in the law over several decades
was the adoption of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990. It
expanded protection to employees against termination for physical and
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mental disabilities. This was a right that had already been granted to
employees of federal contractors in the Vocational Rehabilitation Act
of 1973. Another major boon, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, gave em-
ployees the right to a jury trial, and to both compensatory and punitive
damages, when they were terminated for reasons of race, color, na-
tional origin, religion, or sex. Further, the Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 1993 protected workers from being terminated for tak-
ing unpaid leave for family and medical purposes.
At the same time that Congress was expanding the protection of
workers against unfair terminations for particular reasons, two other
things were occurring that gave workers a claim to just treatment as
a general right. First, beginning in the 1940s, collective bargaining
agreements came to commonly include a provision that workers could
be discharged or disciplined only for just cause. This obligation was
enforced through labor arbitration, in which a neutral third party (an
arbitrator) could make a legally binding determination that the em-
ployee had been unjustly discharged. Because the courts adopted a
policy of keeping their hands off this process in the Steelworkers Tril-
ogy of cases (United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co. 1960; United
Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. 1960; United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. 1960), there was virtually
no way that a labor arbitrator’s decision could be overturned on appeal.
This system has been generally viewed as highly successful, delivering
justice to employees without significantly interfering with manage-
ment’s ability to manage effectively. Its chief limitation is that, because
of the decline of unionization, it only covers a small proportion of the
private sector workforce (about 8.2 percent in 2003).
The second major development has been the voluntary, manage-
ment-initiated adoption of organizational justice procedures by non-
union employers, the more advanced forms of which have come along
relatively recently. Based on data gathered in the late 1970s, Fred
Foulkes (1980) found that, at that time, by far the most common em-
ployer device for handling employee grievances was the open-door
policy, which is a very rudimentary workplace justice procedure. More
advanced forms of nonbinding policies have included 1) installing an
ombudsman—a corporate employee who independently deals with
worker problems; and 2) mediation, where a neutral third party works
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to facilitate a resolution of the dispute (McDermott and Berkeley
1996).
An especially interesting organizational justice procedure origi-
nated in the 1980s—peer review panels. Here, a panel of employees
(and sometimes managers) makes a final decision or recommendation
regarding an employee’s grievance (Grote and Wimberly 1993).
The management-initiated organizational justice system to most
recently rise to prominence is employment arbitration. In employment
arbitration, a nonunion employer requires employees to agree to submit
any complaints (or sometimes any allegations of violation of law on
the part of the employer) to a neutral arbitrator whose duty it is to
render a final and binding decision on the matter (Clark 1997).
There are several questions that need to be answered in regard to
the various management-initiated workplace justice systems. First, do
they deliver substantive results that are fair and reasonably similar to
those obtained in other systems, such as the courts or labor arbitration?
Second, do they provide due process? Third, how do they compare to
one another on these dimensions? It is these questions that the study
reported in this book aims to address.
PLAN OF THE STUDY
The first task in which we engaged was a survey of the literature
on nonunion justice systems. This literature is quite extensive and will
be summarized both here and in Chapters 2 and 3.
The empirical portion of our study has several aspects. In order to
judge the substantive results obtained under these various procedures,
we analyze overall win/loss rates by employees in termination cases in
labor arbitration, employment arbitration, and the federal courts. The
most intensive research strategy is our attempt to determine the degree
to which the same result would be reached in the same cases across
different processes. This is tested by posing scenarios to labor arbitra-
tors, employment arbitrators, managers, members of peer review pan-
els, jurors in employment discrimination cases, and labor court judges
from other countries. By analyzing the responses to these scenarios, we
can compare the relative harshness or leniency of the systems toward
PAGE 5.......................... 10765$ $CH1 06-25-04 11:06:23 PS
6 Wheeler, Klaas, and Mahony
employees for different disciplinary offenses, and the criteria used to
reach decisions.
Whether each procedure provides due process can only be judged
by examining them in some detail. We identify these procedures
through a combination of literature search and survey questions posed
to the various decision makers, and then compare them. The result is a
body of data and analysis that permits us to draw some conclusions on
the differences among these systems as to both outcome and procedure,
and to compare them on the basis of their merits.
THE LITERATURE ON WORKPLACE JUSTICE
What do we know about workplace justice without unions? The
scholarly literature is somewhat helpful in providing ideas and argu-
ments, but is woefully lacking in empirical studies. We will work our
way through the existing literature, dealing first with open door poli-
cies, ombudsmen, mediation, and peer review panels. We will then turn
to the body of knowledge regarding employment arbitration, in order
to consider this important and controversial process in some length.
Why Workplace Justice Systems?
As noted previously, David Ewing (1989) has written that the
workplace is a kind of society. As such, it requires a justice system.
This is consistent with the guiding principles that were instituted in the
founding of the American Republic. According to Ewing, ‘‘More than
any other procedure or device on the business scene, corporate due
process brings to the workplace the humanitarian philosophy that lit up
the American sky two centuries ago’’ (1989, p. 118). In the workplace,
it means that employees are entitled to the assurance that managers are
less likely to make arbitrary decisions about their lives (McCabe 2002).
Yet, these democratic political ideals have seldom been in evidence
in the American workplace. This has been attributed, in part, to a phi-
losophy of management described and prescribed by the early and in-
fluential management theorist Chester I. Barnard. Barnard (1938) held
that managers were the ones best able to distribute, at their discretion,
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the resources of work organizations. This is thought to justify auto-
cratic, rather than democratic, management. ‘‘America has been de-
scribed as a sea of freedom filled with islands of despotism . . .’’ (Scott
1988, p. 294). The American corporation has been one of the islands.
The rise of workplace justice procedures in nonunion firms has
been attributed to the rising importance lent by workers to the notion
of ‘‘due process’’ (McCabe 2002). This may amount to a revolution of
expectations on the part of workers, a ‘‘second civil rights revolution’’
(Ewing 1977, p. 39). Additionally, there are many reasons for firms to
adopt these procedures, including 1) ‘‘developing a relationship of mu-
tual trust and respect with employees’’; 2) holding unions ‘‘at bay’’;
3) ‘‘reducing litigation and litigation expenses’’; 4) ensuring ‘‘greater
compliance with the company’s personnel policies’’; 5) pressuring
managers to ‘‘deal constructively with their subordinates’ complaints
and solve them on the spot if possible’’; 6) providing feedback on the
effects of policies on employees; 7) boosting morale; and 8) attracting
and retaining good employees (Ewing 1989, pp. 6–9). Spotting and
solving problems at an early stage before they fester is yet another
advantage (McCabe 2002).
What is Due Process in the Workplace?
Some of the requirements of workplace due process are that there
must be a procedure; it must have—and follow—rules; it must not
be arbitrary; and it must be known to employees, predictable so that
employees know that previous decisions on worker rights will be fol-
lowed, ‘‘institutionalized,’’ easy to use, perceived as equitable, and ap-
plicable to all employees (Ewing 1977, p. 156). It must be ‘‘timely,
accessible and inexpensive,’’ include the right of the employee to rep-
resented by another employee, provide the right to present evidence
and rebut charges, have ‘‘as much privacy and confidentiality as is
practicable,’’ have ‘‘a fair and impartial fact-finding process and hear-
ing,’’ provide objective and reasonable decisions with appropriate rem-
edies, and be free from retaliation against the employee (Ewing 1989,
pp. 6–7). It has been argued that this should include the right to have
outside arbitration or some other mutually agreed-upon process (Wer-
hane 1985).
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‘‘Soft’’ Justice Systems
The justice systems which are the least intrusive upon management
prerogatives are those that are considered ‘‘soft.’’ These are procedures
that do not bind management to any particular outcome. Instead of
resulting in a legally binding determination, they provide a means of
working out an agreed-upon solution. They sometimes constitute the
early stages of more intrusive systems, and are comprised of three dif-
ferent procedures: the open-door policy, mediation, and the use of an
ombudsman.
Open-door policy
The most common of the corporate procedures for resolving em-
ployee complaints is the open-door policy. In its simplest form, it is a
policy statement that says that employees who have a problem are free
to discuss it with management. The basic idea is one of managerial
openness to employee complaints, even if this involves the employee
going over the head of the immediate supervisor.
A study published in 1980 (Foulkes) found open-door policies to
be quite ‘‘commonplace’’ (p. 300). The sample of policies reported by
Foulkes included some rather complex policies that utilize multiple
steps in the management hierarchy. They often include statements that
an employee can use the policy without fear of reprisal. Also, they
commonly encourage employees to settle their problems at the lowest
practicable level of supervision.
The intent of these policies is to encourage employees to talk with
managers in a friendly and informal fashion. The door of even such a
dignitary as the president of the company is sometimes held open, and
the human resources manager may be a step in the process (McCabe
2002). Open-door policies are often broader in their scope than union-
ized grievance procedures, encouraging employees to raise a wide
range of problems and questions (McCabe 2002).
The effectiveness of open-door policies appears to vary from com-
pany to company. The interviews with personnel staff and managers
reported by Foulkes (1980) show opinions ranging from avid approval
to the statement that the policy is merely a ‘‘myth’’ (p. 309). Many
times, although the door is supposed to be open, almost no one walks
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through it (McCabe 2002), or only trivial questions are raised. Employ-
ees may believe that they will not get a fair hearing because there is
considerable social distance between rank and file employees and high
company officials, which may discourage employees from using the
procedure to its fullest extent. Perhaps most critically, it is difficult to
convince employees that going over their bosses’ heads will not lead
to reprisals (McCabe 2002). In the case of employment termination,
many upper level managers feel a necessity to support the actions of
lower level managers, or employees may believe this to be the case.
This makes the use of the procedure an unattractive channel for a com-
plaint regarding a discharge.
Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate any rigorous empir-
ical studies of open-door policies. For the purposes of studying termi-
nation of employment, however, they are probably not a particularly
fruitful subject of inquiry.
Mediation
Mediation utilizes the services of a neutral third party to help the
parties to a dispute resolve it. The mediator is not a decision maker;
rather, mediators serve as facilitators. The use of mediation is a ‘‘soft’’
form of dispute resolution because it imposes on the parties no binding
result. Its methods are those of ‘‘win–win’’ bargaining, and as such, it
provides opportunities for the employer and the employee to work out
a mutually agreeable solution to an employment problem in a relatively
nonadversarial setting (McDermott and Berkeley 1996).
Mediation has been said to provide a forum that is more likely
to facilitate settlement than the more adversarial procedures involving
adjudication. It is confidential, may produce a settlement at an early
stage, provides an opportunity to redirect emotions, is adaptable and
flexible, and can provide feelings of personal empowerment in cases
such as those involving sexual harassment (Harkavy 1999).
The increase in formal grievance procedures for nonunion employ-
ees during the 1980s and 1990s has included an increase in the use of
mediation. It has been argued that the overall phenomenon of increased
mediation procedures has arisen partly because of ‘‘the increased will-
ingness of disgruntled employees to file lawsuits and administrative
agency complaints,’’ and the resulting increase in the desire of employ-
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ers to resolve these complaints by some means other than litigation
(Feuille 1999, p. 205). Also, the availability of punitive damages and
the right to jury trial given to workers claiming discrimination by the
1991 Civil Rights Act have encouraged employers to seek alternative
means of dispute resolution. The related phenomenon of the take-up of
employment arbitration by employers in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane (1991) and Cir-
cuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams (2001a), discussed in Chapter 2, has
involved the increased use of mediation (Feuille 1999).
Surveys of employers conducted in the mid 1990s showed large
proportions of employers, particularly among the larger corporations,
using some form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), with media-
tion often being the preferred form (Feuille 1999). A study of five large
firms that had adopted employment arbitration by 1997 showed that
three of them had various forms of pre-arbitration dispute resolution
procedures, including mediation. In 1999, the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) started encouraging employers to use
ADR in handling discrimination claims, and initial analyses of this
experience yielded positive results (Feuille 1999).
While mediation is widely admired as a dispute resolving process,
it may be difficult to apply in the highly stressed atmosphere of a termi-
nation case. This is especially true if, as is usually the case, it is utilized
subsequent to the discharge. Nevertheless, practitioners are generally
of the opinion that it can frequently be helpful and seldom harmful.
Therefore, it can be an important element in a workplace justice
system.
Ombudsman
The corporate ombudsman ‘‘is a neutral member of the corporation
who provides confidential and informal assistance to employees in re-
solving work-related concerns’’ (Kandel and Frumer 1994, p. 587). In
the mid 1990s, it was estimated that about 500 corporations, most of
them with 500 or more employees, had an ombudsman system in place
(McDermott and Berkeley 1996).
Two crucial elements of an ombudsman program are that the om-
budsman keep communications with employees confidential, and that
the ombudsman be independent of management (McDermott and
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Berkeley 1996). If ombudsman programs meet these conditions, they
have considerable potential for removing communication barriers and
helping to resolve disputes. A problem for ombudsmen is that they are
in a position that is fraught with danger for their own careers. On one
hand, they need to be independent of management, while on the other,
it is expecting a great deal of upper level managers to assume that
they will ignore the negative effects on the company’s supervisors and
finances that an energetic and assertive ombudsman can sometimes
produce. Therefore, it is difficult for an ombudsman to maintain inde-
pendence, and to be perceived by workers as being independent (Coo-
per, Nolan, and Bales 2000).
‘‘Hard’’ Justice Systems
There are several justice systems that, unlike the ‘‘soft’’ ones, may
impose a legally binding decision on the employer. These are peer
review, employment arbitration, and labor arbitration. Peer review is
actually something of a hybrid between soft and hard systems, since it
may or may not result in a final and legally binding decision, while the
others always do. We will discuss it here, leaving for later consideration
the purely hard systems.
Peer review, which originated in the mid 1980s, was originally
intended to be primarily a union-avoidance strategy. General Electric’s
Appliance Park plant in Columbia, Maryland, is where it started (Grote
and Wimberly 1993). Recent research (Colvin 2003) provides evidence
that union avoidance remains a significant motivation for the establish-
ment of peer review committees. These systems ‘‘shift some personnel
decisions from the company to the aggrieved employee’s peers’’ (Coo-
per, Nolan, and Bales 2000, p. 664).
The procedures used by peer review systems vary considerably
(Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000). However, they follow a general pat-
tern of having worker complaints go to a hearing-like stage where a
panel that is comprised of employees makes a decision regarding the
worker complaint. The panel usually includes some managers, but the
majority of the panel is made up of nonmanagerial employees. The
original General Electric panels consisted of three members who were
fellow workers and two who were managers (Grote and Wimberly
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1993), which is the same makeup used in the Marriott system (Wilen-
sky and Jones 1994).
The Marriott system is fairly typical. In it, 10 to 15 percent of
employees in each of 50 business units are trained to be peer review
panelists. Their names are placed in a box and drawn by the grieving
employee. The employee can draw up to six names of peers, from
which the employee chooses three. The employee then draws from a
box the names of up to four managers, from whom the employee
chooses two. The five persons chosen then make up the panel, which
is required to hear and decide the case within 10 days of their selection
(Wilensky and Jones 1994).
Other features of the Marriott system that are also considered typi-
cal require that the panel only interpret and apply company policies—it
does not have the authority to change or abolish company policies.
Generally, a human resources professional facilitates the operation of
the panel.
The Marriott panels make final and binding decisions. This last
element is one in which some companies’ procedures vary, as some
make the panel’s decision only a recommendation for management
action. However, making the panel’s decision nonbinding may subject
it to attack under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). The NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer
to dominate or interfere with a ‘‘labor organization.’’ In the case of
Keeler Brass Automotive Group (1995), the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) held that an employee committee of this type that did
not make a final and binding decision was engaged in ‘‘dealing with’’
the employer over wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employ-
ment, and was therefore a ‘‘labor organization’’ under the law. Setting
up and managing such an organization is a violation of Sec. 8 (a)(2) of
the NLRA. In Sparks Nugget, Inc. (1977), the NLRB had decided that
a panel that made a final and binding decision was legal. Interestingly,
some companies have made a decision to make peer review panel deci-
sions only recommendatory, requiring the approval of management
when they uphold a termination, even though they recognize that this
likely violates the NLRA. The reason for a company to ignore the law
likely lies in the fact that there are no penalties for violating it, and the
worst that can happen is that the NLRB can order the company to
change its practice in the future.
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How well do peer review panels work? It is claimed that employees
like them, primarily because they deliver an objective and fair decision
(Wilensky and Jones 1994). Managers tend to like peer review because
it helps employees understand the management point of view, with
employees being less likely to blame managers for disciplinary actions
(Wilensky and Jones 1994; Cooper, Nolan, and Bales 2000). One firm
found that peer review dramatically reduced employee filings with the
EEOC (Wilensky and Jones 1994). In addition, there is some anecdotal
evidence supporting the belief of managers that peers will be more
harsh with employees than managers would be (Cooper, Nolan, and
Bales 2000). A result attributed to peer review that is to the advantage
of both workers and managers is that managers tend to be more careful
in making decisions if they know that those decisions will be reviewed
by a peer review panel (Wilensky and Jones 1994).
On its face, peer review appears to be an extraordinary delegation
of power by management to rank and file employees. From the point
of view of traditional analysis of management/employee relations, it is
certainly an anomaly. How, then, does one explain this from the stand-
point of managers’ self-interest? Is it simply that they believe in em-
powering workers and are willing to give up authority in pursuit of
this ideal? Is it that they believe that this will lead to efficiencies and
profitability? Is it mainly a union avoidance technique? Or, do they
believe that employees will be more severe than managers, so that they
are cynically delegating an unpleasant task at no cost, given that pun-
ishments will be upheld more often by peer review committees than
they would by upper management?
The answer may be some combination of several of the above con-
siderations. The explanation cannot be based simply on ideological
grounds. If management believes that satisfied workers perform better,
they might favor a procedure that would increase satisfaction, hoping
that this would lead to greater productivity. The prevention of litigation
would lead to lower costs, thereby contributing to efficiency. The
avoidance of unions is certainly among the motivations, and peer re-
view may provide a substitute for one of the main advantages of union-
ism—an effective grievance system. A human resources manager was
overheard to remark that her company’s peer review procedure had
worked well in its first test because management had won the case. This
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made it fairly clear what management’s criterion was for a successful
program—the peer review committee denying the grievance. Also, the
establishment of peer review committees has been found to be related
to the adoption of more general high-performance management sys-
tems (i.e., teams and the like) (Colvin 2003). This may indicate that
peer review is often just one aspect of an overall policy of employee
involvement.
The most important effects from both the employer and employee
perspectives may be more subtle and long-range. It may well be that
supervisors take greater care with disciplinary actions when they know
that a relatively objective review of these actions will be made. Clearly,
this is the hope for positive effects of the ‘‘hard’’ processes generally—
that the prospect of having a decision overturned will make for better,
more objectively justifiable decisions. It is precisely this that is a prime
requirement for the provision of human dignity at the workplace.
From a management perspective, it may be extremely helpful in
the long run to have a group of rank and file employees (trained peer
review panel members) who have a sympathetic understanding of the
difficulties that managers face in discipline cases. The role of a man-
ager is often a difficult one, and it can only be eased by making subor-
dinates aware of this fact.
There are many questions that remain unanswered about peer re-
views. Are they fair? How do their decisions compare with those
reached in other ‘‘hard’’ processes? Are they indeed more severe than
managers would be? Does the presence of managers and the participa-
tion of human resources professionals permit the co-opting of employ-
ees into accepting management decisions? Are peer review panel
members truly independent of management? We attempt to deal with
at least a few of these in this study.
PLAN OF THE BOOK
In the next two chapters, we will discuss the literature and evidence
on the most heavily studied of the ‘‘hard’’ management-initiated dis-
pute resolution procedures—employment arbitration. In the chapters
that follow, we will set out the methods and samples employed in our
study, the data gathered, our various analyses of the data, and some
general conclusions.
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